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Blurred Lines: The Hybridisation of Russian Non-profit Organisations 
 




In this chapter, we look at the impact of the system of managed democracy on Non-Profit 
Organisations (NPOs) in the Russian Federation and focus on the way in which the lines 
between them and the agencies of the state have become increasingly blurred. This 
development is part of the widespread growth in the creation of hybrid organisations on an 
international scale (Billis, 2010). Hybridity is the result of organisations crossing sectoral 
boundaries (Pache and Santos, 2013) to form a combination of the characteristics of two or 
more sectors.  
 
One of the more common forms of hybrid organisation blurs the boundaries between NPOs 
and the state as the former engages in the delivery of public services that had previously 
been the role of statutory agencies (Billis, 2010). This blurring of sectoral boundaries 
between NPOs and state is not simply a transfer of practices but involves more fundamental 
changes to the way organisations operate (Bromley and Meyer, 2014). It means that 
organisations attempt to adhere to different, if not competing, institutional logics  - the 
rules that govern the various sectors (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Brandsen et al., 2005; 
Doherty et al., 2014; Pache and Santos, 2010). NPOs might, for example, attempt to marry a 
third sector logic based on collective ownership, engaging constituencies, altruism, provision 
of free support and/or democratic leadership with a state bureaucracy logic based on 
centralised control, rule-based mechanisms for service provision and/or hierarchical 
structures.  
 
As a result, the expectations that NPOs represent some kind of panacea that is able to offset 
neo-liberal inspired changes to welfare provisions and facilitate accountability and increased 
public participation in policy are increasingly questioned. In Russia, we found that its NPOs 
have integrated more closely with the public sector and this has led to blurred sectoral 
boundaries. The resulting hybridity is driven by  and is a key feature of - Russias system of 
managed democracy. We find that, as a result, NPOs focus less on encouraging public 
participation, engagement in advocacy, or holding the state to account. We draw on 
qualitative data collected from health and education NPOs and environmental organisations 
in a variety of Russian industrial regions. We have focused on organisations in the regions 
because they operate in the industrial areas where the majority of Russians live. The data 
used have been collected via semi-structured interviews and observations in a variety of 
different research projects that have studied the activities of NPOs in the Russian context.  
 
We draw on these data to explore how macro-institutional forces have encouraged these 
organisations to focus on building vertical ties with state authorities rather than with the 
public. We show how NPOs are involved in the blurring of boundaries both by engaging and 
building ties with state authorities and by accessing resources from the state. This has the 
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result of turning NPOs into hybrid organisations  part agents of the third sector and part 
agents of the state. But we begin by establishing the context for the studies by presenting 
an overview of the development of the third sector in the Russian Federation. 
 
The Development of NPOs in the Russian Federation 
The break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation as an 
independent state led to a process of democratisation (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013) that 
stimulated the setting up and growth of NPOs. This development was not, however, the 
result of action by the Russian state. In the 1990s it largely ignored NPOs (Pickvance, 1998) 
and provided limited resources to them. Instead, NPOs relied on donations from overseas 
(Henderson, 2002). Much of this overseas funding was allocated through a process of 
competitive tendering which meant that, in order to be eligible to access these resources, 
Russian NPOs needed to adopt the agenda of donors rather than reflect the needs and 
demands of the Russian public (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010; Javeline and Lindemann-
Komarova, 2010). At the same time, NPOs also became adept at developing vertical ties (i.e. 
agency relationships) with their donors (Salmenniemi, 2008) rather than focusing on 
building horizontal ties with other organisations to form coalitions or collaborations.  
 
This early stage in the development of Russian NPOs was also influenced by the continuing 
mistrust between the public and governing elites that characterised Soviet culture (Howard, 
2002). The Russian public extended this mistrust to NPOs, which saw their public support 
dwindle and resulted in persistently low rates of participation in NPOs (Kamerade et al., 
2016). This was not helped by the continuing dominance of Soviet cultural values in political 
institutions (Hedlund, 2006) as well as in social organisations such as NPOs (Spencer, 2011), 
which meant that the majority of Russian NPOs remained parochial and inward-looking 
(Crotty, 2006; Mendelson and Gerber, 2007; Spencer, 2011) and were themselves 
uninterested in engaging the wider public.  
 
The ascendance to power of President Putin has led to the emergence of a system termed 
managed democracy in which the state controlled all significant areas of societal activity 
(Wegren and Konitzer, 2007). As part of this process, the Russian state attempted to re-
nationalise the third sector and its agents (Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Robertson, 2009) 
taking advantage of the propensity of NPOs to rely on vertical ties to their resource 
providers. Funding and other resources are now made available to NPOs via the Civic 
Chamber of the Russian Federation (Richter, 2009). Persistently low donations per head 
(only 6% of the Russian population made a donation to charity in 2013 (CAF Russia, 2014)) 
means that resources provided by the Civic Chamber are an important source of income for 
Russian NPOs.  
 
In addition, the Russian state has adopted a regulatory framework that involves the scrutiny 
of NPO activity and membership (Crotty et al., 2014; Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014), and it 
has placed restrictions on the receipt of overseas funds (Machleder, 2006).  NPOs engaged 
in what can be loosely defined as political activity and receive overseas funding are now 
considered to be foreign agents (Bennetts, 2012). NPOs have also been affected by further 
regulatory changes including the imposition of heavy fines for unofficial demonstrations 
(Bryanski, 2012), the criminalization of libel and an increase in internet censorship (Lewis, 
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2013). These changes have made it difficult for NPOs to access funding to foreign donors 
and have also limited their scope for playing the third sectors important role in 
representing and protecting the interests of their constituents.  
 
At the same time, the Russian state paid more direct attention to NPOs (Salamon et al., 
2015) and used the structures of the Civic Chamber to stimulate state-NPO interaction 
(Richter, 2009). The Civic Chamber and its regional and local offshoots were presented as an 
open but institutionalised platform on which NPOs could raise concerns and represent the 
interests of their constituencies (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2016) and hence hold the state to 
account (Richter, 2009). The impact of this system was to control and constrain advocacy by 
NPOs and close down any attempts at open dissent. In this way, it encouraged Russian NPOs 
to build vertical ties with their new donor (the Russian state (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 
2014)).  
 
This stick and carrot approach to the management of third sector agents has been termed 
(by Daucé, 2015) the duality of coercion. On the one hand the state used regulatory 
powers to suppress NPO activity - in particular (horizontal) domestic or international 
cooperation for advocacy or protest purposes and for holding the state to account - and, on 
the other, simultaneously encouraged NPOs to contribute to what is presented as the 
amelioration of social ills (Krasnopolskaya et al., 2015; Salamon et al., 2015). Having been 
ignored by the state in the 1990s, NPOs were now taking up the more recent opportunities 
for interacting with the state and had become reliant on ties with ruling and governing elites 
to access resources and help to navigate this complex environment. As a result, they were 
becoming hybrid organisations that blurred the lines between the third sector and the state 
by becoming in part agents of the third sector and in part agents of the state. In the next 
two sections of the chapter, we explore empirical data from two kinds of Russian NPOs  
those engaged in health and education on the one hand and those concerned with the 
environment on the other. 
 
Blurring the Lines by Building Vertical Ties: Health and Education NPOs 
 
In this section, we draw on data collected from 80 non-profit organisations engaged in 
health and education related causes (from here on termed heNPOs) across three industrial 
regions in Russia - Yekaterinburg, Samara, and Perm. Details of the organisations included in 
this part of our study are in set out in Appendix A. They were engaged in a wide range of 
activities relating to health and education such as the provision of health services or the 
provision of afternoon children clubs with an educational focus. The majority of them were 
small in size (for example in terms of members or staff) although some organisations listed 
in Appendix A had high levels of membership and staff.  They tended to be led by middle-
aged women in line with the feminine nature of Russian human service NPOs observed by 
Salmenniemi (2005), Many of these organisations operated on minimal financial resources 
or none at all and only a few of them had been able to gain funding from the Civic Chamber.  
Several of the older heNPOs, primarily the ones that existed in the 1990s, had received 
foreign funding in the past but this had dried up post-2006 (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014).  
 
The institutionalisation of state-NPO interaction has resulted in the establishment of a 
myriad of roundtables (kruglyye stoly) or committees (Richter, 2009). Involvement in these 
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can be seen as a means of reducing the ability of NPOs to challenge the activities of state 
authorities but it also provides them with access to state structures for the first time since 
the demise of the Soviet Union. This provided them with the opportunity to build vertical 
ties with governing elites through the states role as a key resource provider and provided 
key individuals or key organisational human resources in heNPOs with the incentive for 
services delivery and carry out other work on behalf of the state. This led to the 
development of an overlap between the roles and responsibilities of individuals active in 
heNPOs and those working within the agencies of the state that blurred the line between 
where the responsibilities of the state end and the work of heNPOs take over. In previous 
work, the authors had highlighted the role of the individuals at the centre of these 
developments who have the responsibility of managing the boundary between the third 
sector and the state authorities (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2017).  In effect, they are in 
responsible for negotiating, coordinating and/or filtering the logics (Lee and Lounsbury, 
2015; Smets et al., 2015) governing these two different sectors. We term this process 
sucking in (Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2017). In order to explore these developments 
empirically, we now turn our attention to the ways in which individuals within heNPOs have 
built, understood, and utilised their ties with state authorities and/or governing and ruling 
elites. 
 
Respondents from our dataset highlighted the fact that they had been sucked in to work for 
the state as a consequence of attending roundtables and committees (Respondents 49, 51, 
61, 62).  Examples included the acquisition of a desk in the state administration 
(Respondent 51); acting as regular consultants or as an expert with the department of 
education (Respondent 52); providing advice as an expert (Respondent 49); and working in 
close physical proximity with state agencies  our office is down the corridor from the 
department of social protection (Respondent 75). A further benefit of these arrangements 
was the provision of access to resources such as office space (Respondents 1, 2, 3, 14, 23). 
Respondents also highlighted their use of emerging vertical ties as a means of securing 
government support (Respondent 60) without which it will be difficult for us to do our 
work (Respondent 81) or talk to the people that could help [them do their work] 
(Respondent 64).  Similarly, respondent 52 told us that her government role meant that she 
could access premises from which to run her heNPO  many old nursery buildings were in 
decay, [and subsequently] we were given this building here [by the state], which we 
refurbished with money from sponsors and the state. Her heNPO now used this building as 
a base for their work with children with mental health needs.  Another respondent reported 
that her organisation had been unable to pay staff a wage. As a result of her participation in 
state-run committees, however, she had been able to convince state authorities to hire me 
and the organisations other employees (Respondent 65). Now all its staff were employed 
fulltime by the state to run their heNPO which promoted physical activity amongst children 
with learning difficulties. Both organisations were insistent that without these ties they 
would not have been helping all these children (Respondent 52) or continuing the work of 
enabling such children to do physical activity (Respondent 65).  Respondents thus 
illustrated how they had been sucked in to work for the state through direct state access 
and resources.  
 
In addition to direct support and resources, collaboration with state authorities was also 
considered to be an important benefit of these vertical ties. It enabled heNPOs to work 
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closely together with the government authorities (Respondent 05) and find a good way to 
collaborate with the state (Respondent 51). As a result, heNPOs had closer contact to the 
department (Respondent 15) and an increased ability to cooperate with the state 
(Respondent 3) or to work with state institutions (Respondent 22). Respondents also felt 
that building cross-sector partnerships or collaborations were greatly aided by the sucking in 
of key decision makers within heNPOs. 
 
Without between sector interactions, you would not survive a day, so we build good 
relations with the regional powers. These relations are constructive because we 
offer services and programs, which they [the state] accept and support (Respondent 
1). 
 
These closer ties provided individuals with opportunities to engage with policymakers which 
highlighted not only how they were sucked in or co-opted but also how they were able to 
negotiate and manage the boundary between the state and the third sector. HeNPOs could 
thus utilise vertical ties with the state to support their work. They also perceived being 
sucked in as a way of engaging with the state; the state now listen(ed) to our problems 
(Respondent 15) and showed appreciation (Respondent 19, Respondent 9).  Hence, 
collaborative work enabled heNPO to make friends in the administration (Respondent 79) 
as well as delivering services, helping constituencies, or more generally engaging in day to 
day activities. Engaging in these activities was seen as always a win-win situation 
(Respondent 52). HeNPOs, therefore, were able to utilise emergent vertical ties for their 
advantage as well as successfully redrawing/managing the boundary between state and 
their sector.  
 
Not all respondents, however, took such a positive view of the blurring of the boundaries 
between the state and NPOs. One perceived disadvantage of this development was the 
nature of the relationship between a heNPO and the state. Rather than being seen as a 
genuine collaboration between the two parties this was restricted to the targeted co-option 
by the state of specific individuals who possessed some specific human capital or expertise. 
 
They [the authorities] look for the key decision makers in the third sector and then 
work with us to develop the third sector so it can do what it needs too. (Respondent 
45) 
 
This was a sentiment shared by respondents that had not been sucked in. Their view was 
that the administration only works with the organisations they like (Respondent 31), and it 
specifically targeted those organisations that did not explicitly challenge the state. As a 
result, some respondents feared that the third sector would be divided into two groups  
those organisations which were able to interact with the state and the others that would be 
sidelined.  
 
I think the danger is that an elite of HENPOs is emerging. As a result, the state will 
only interact with them and other organisations will have no chance to work with 
the state. (Respondent 37) 
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The views of other heNPOs resonated with this statement. They feared that sucking in was a 
double-edged sword, positive for those that were able to establish vertical ties and access 
resources but negative for those that missed out on them.  
 
Our informal probing of the respondents tended to suggest that henPOs working with 
children or disabled people were more likely to benefit positively from their contacts with 
state organisations and were more likely to be sucked in than those which dealt with 
HIV/AIDS or drug abuse (Respondents 25, 30, 37, 43, 45, 48). The organisations that had 
access to the state tended to be viewed as part of the state structure and so had lost their 
connection with the public (Respondent 42). This division of agents into what the state 
considered to be appropriate third sector actors and what they did not is important as it 
was the former that was undergoing hybridisation.  The boundary between the state and 
the Russian third sector became even more blurred when the respondents highlighted the 
extent to which they observed the overlap between how they defined the role of the 
government and the way they identified the objectives of their organisation. Respondent 
51s role, for example, included the responsibility for overseeing on behalf of the local state 
the regulations for accessibility to public buildings throughout the city. This overlapped with 
the key objective of her organisation to promote and ensure accessibility to public buildings 
and spaces. Similarly, respondent 19 was responsible for the implementation of the citys 
youth programme and policies as part of her role as an agent of the state. 
 
I do not work here [in this heNPO] all the time.  I work for the state and I focus on 
the development of youth policy. (Respondent 19) 
 
The mission statement of her organisation was to improv[e] the life of children.  
 
As key sucked in individuals from third sector organisations played these kinds of roles they 
became supporters or legitimisers of state policy (Cook and Vinogradova, 2006) and lost 
their ability to criticise or oppose it. In the process, these heNPOs had become hybrid 
organisations with characteristics of both the third sector and the state.  Thus, as observed 
in other similar contexts, this contributes to the legitimacy of current power arrangements 
rather than challenging them (Hsu, 2010; Lewis, 2013). Hence hybridisation on NPOs in the 
Russian context is as much an outcome of organisational necessities (as elsewhere) as it is 
an outcome of current power arrangements.  
 
Blurring the Lines through Resource Provision: Environmental NPOs 
 
For this part of the chapter, we draw on data from 26 environmental NPOs (eNPOs) situated 
in the Samara and Volgograd Oblasts and in Stavropol Krai. Like the heNPOS discussed 
above, these organisations tended to be small in size, but, unlike them, had in the main a 
longer history. Their activities included the preservation of a local national park; the 
protection of animals; and environmental education of the public (fuller details are set out   
Appendix B). They operated on minimal or no existing financial resources; many of the 
organisations had received foreign funding in the past but had yet to find a way to offset its 
disappearance by securing replacements from domestic sources.  
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The data collected from eNPOs identifies a different kind of hybridisation from that 
experienced in the heNPOs discussed earlier. Rather than developing vertical ties that led to 
boundary crossing between state and third sector hybridisation was driven by access to the 
resources which influenced the kinds of activity undertaken by eNPOs. The majority of them 
had orientated their campaigning activity to that which was perceived as acceptable to the 
state and they had now focused on non-confrontational, apolitical activities. By focusing on 
activities such as environmental education and conservation eNPOs have supplemented the 
work of the state even if they have stopped short of crossing the boundary into it. 
Discussions with eNPO leaders revealed just how closely linked organisational identity had 
become to the prevailing funding context. The presence of the Civic Chamber and the need 
for groups to align their objectives to those of the state in order to secure funding 
dominated the data. ENPOs were split into two groups, those at risk of being 
institutionalised (Tarrow, 1989) who felt it was necessary to have a strong public image in 
particular vis-à-vis the state (in order to access funding), and those risking isolation who 
tried to remain independent (rejecting state funding).  
 
Public image and reputation were perceived by many groups as paramount if their 
organisation and activities were to have both influence (1.9) and access to state funds. It 
was important for them to have a good reputation (1.10) to ensure more chances to 
cooperate (1.10). Interviewees also spoke of the need to have acceptance in the funding 
community (1.7), to prove (1.2) themselves, and to be well known (1.6) in order to 
collaborate with the authorities (1.6). Given the lack of anonymity within this process 
(Richter, 2009), the better the image of the eNPO then the greater chance that funding 
applications to the Civic Chamber would be viewed favourably. Those eNPOs working with 
the Civic Chamber described groups outside of this structure as amateurs (1.7) or not 
professional (2.2) because they did not have the capabilities to develop a relevant public 
image and reputation. The requirement to align organisations with state priorities was the 
major driver of hybridisation amongst eNPOs. 
 
Within the prevailing political environment (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 1988) eNPOs 
faced a funding dilemma (Melucci, 1989). Seeking state funding via competitive grants from 
the Civic Chamber and thus adopting the states interests required some degree of 
institutionalisation (Tarrow, 1989) and involved the development of a hybrid form of 
organisation. The alternative strategy - to attempt to raise money themselves and set their 
own campaigning agenda  would lead them to remain a more pure third sector actor. 
Many groups recognised that the former approach would result in the subjugation of 
individual group interests to those of the state, as indicated by the following extracts: 
 
If you want to win grants and be active then you can win these grants, but your 
actions will be totally controlled by the powers that be. (3.1) 
 
The state will only provide financing for their NPOs, groups of people who have 
surrendered their independence and simply carry out the orders of their political 
masters  Now the grants are simply bought for those organisations which are 
willing to play the game and will allow the grant-giving bodies to dictate the 
frameworks in which they will operate. (3.3) 
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Those which had secured funding also acknowledged the tension between individual and 
state interests, but  unsurprisingly - viewed relationships with the state in a positive way: 
 
When we carry out a project using the government financing, and if the Ministry is 
interested in business participating in the project, it may become a joint project, and 
thus it strengthens the project and minimizes the expenditures. (1.7) 
 
Without guaranteed sources of income outside of those provided by the state, the primary 
concern of the Russian environmental movement had become finance (or the lack of it). 
Funding, rather than environmental concerns, had become the key issue. This reflects the 
work of Piven and Cloward (1977) who asserted that, over time, groups might become more 
concerned with their survival than with their original goals. The prioritisation of funding 
goals is also frequently associated with the hybridisation of NPOs in other contexts (Billis, 
2010). 
 
As a result, the experience of eNPOs was similar to that of the heNPOs discussed above. 
Although eNPOs lacked the close integration with state structures displayed by heNPOs, 
most of the eNPOs in our dataset engaged in activity that could be described as co-
operational or safe, focusing on educational and childrens projects (1.3; 1.6; 1.11; 1.12; 
1.14; 1.16; 2.2); conservation (1.12; 1.14; 2.3); and hosting or attending conferences and 
exhibitions (1.2; 1.6; 1.8; 2.1; 3.1). Thus, while not crossing the boundary into activity 
undertaken by the state, many groups were supplementing it by their work, particularly in 
the spheres of education and conservation, and took on some of the aspects of 
hybridisation as a result.   Those in receipt of state funding were unlikely to engage in 
activity that was not supportive of the state. Similarly, eNPOs that had close links and 
funding from industrial enterprises (1.13; 1.16; 3.4) were also unlikely to engage in critical or 
oppositional relationships with them.   
 
Many organisations also failed to express their core environmental interests through their 
activities. It was commonplace for them to engage in broad activities such as the education 
of children, conservation and attending conferences without addressing any prescribed 
environmental purpose or objective.  As a result, there were very few instances of 
confrontational mobilisation on environmental issues and the Russian environmental 
movement did not aspire to become a mass movement (Weiner, 2002), focusing instead on 
safe campaigning issues with a view to maximizing agency within the restrictions of the 
new Russian political landscape. This, in turn, shaped the scope and content of groups 
networks (Tilly and Wood, 2013). Those working with the state described the networks that 
included the Governor, the vice-Governor (1.6), presidents of big companies (1.7) or a 
wide range of relationships in different economic and political spheres (2.2). These offered 
a direct channel to networks that were both formal and resource-rich (Eesley and Lenox, 
2006).  
 
A small minority of eNPOs sought to maintain their independence and their ability to 
express their concerns by looking for other sources of funding and resources. Those eNPOs, 
usually smaller, grassroots organisations, were keen to stress their independent (1.1; 1.8; 
1.9; 3.2; 3.3; 3.6) nature. They asserted their independence of Civic Chamber funding in 
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order to give them the freedom to pursue interests of their own choosing, as one 
participant articulated:  
 
There are many who think its vital to support the authority and they are well 
financed. [1.1] is not sponsored (funded by the state) but on the other hand, we are 
not afraid to express our attitude. (1.1) 
 
In demarcating themselves from the majority of eNPOs that aligned themselves with the 
state, eNPOs in this group described the former as puppet organisations (1.9) or not real 
(3.1). The difference was also reflected in their description of the networks they maintained 
to realise their work as friends (1.3) that had come together because they had similar 
opinions (1.3) and similar objectives (1.3). Only one respondent (1.16) mentioned their 
access to industrial and regional elites while the rest of them described their relationship 
with elites as non-existent, as 3.3 and 3.6 explained: 
 
Previously, we had positive relations with many of the major factories in Volgograd 
region. Now these relations are very strained. We have virtually no interaction with 
them now. They are not interested in listening to us and co-operating with us. (3.3) 
 
We have spoken or tried to speak to the local councillors on numerous occasions, 
but our efforts fell on deaf ears. (3.6) 
 
With limited access to both industrial and governing elites, independent eNPOs had little 
access to resources that could be secured through such networks and this further 
entrenched the disparities and inconsistencies between eNPOs and their ability to mobilise 
(Routledge 2003).  They gained access to resources by engaging with the logic of state 
bureaucracy. This took place at the expense of the logic of the third sector as hybridisation 
facilitated institutionalisation and favoured organisational survival as the priority for NPOs 
in Russias managed democracy. While eNPOs had stopped short of becoming boundary 
crossers in the way that their heNPOs counterparts had, their organisational goals had 
become more focused on the acquisition of resources and this had, in turn, brought them 
closer to the states environmental objectives than their own. At the same time, many of 
their activities supplemented the work of the state in areas like education and conservation. 
Our study of the two kinds of organisation - heNPOs and eNPOs  has highlighted how they 
followed two different paths towards becoming hybrid organisations. In the concluding 
section of the chapter, we discuss the commonalities of the trends and pressures that led 
them in this direction.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we have highlighted two different paths that hybridisation has taken in the 
context of the Russian Federation. The eNPOs had experienced comparatively indirect and 
informal drivers to hybridity. The curtailment of political opportunity (McCarthy and Zald, 
1977) and restricted access to resources had made the Civic Chamber the primary funding 
source for the Russian Environmental Movement (Crotty et al., 2014). In turn, eNPOs had 
limited their aims and activities to ensure that they were perceived to be eligible for 
obtaining resources. Groups not wishing to engage with the Chamber could only rely on only 
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their own personal resources or the funds those they could raise in a difficult philanthropic 
environment (Sundstrom, 2005). As a result, eNPOs were forced to make a choice between  
institutionalisation [or] isolation (Tarrow, 1989: 138) which in turn determined the scope 
and nature of their activity. Many eNPOs pursued safe, apolitical activities and chose not to 
engage with the more contentious socio-economic environmental consequences of both 
Soviet and Russian economic policy.  We did not see the Russian Environmental Movement 
making strategic decisions about changes to policy, cultural codes or ways of thinking about 
contentious environmental issues on a wider scale (Melucci, 1989). Instead, the great 
majority of the eNPOs we studied had presented themselves in ways that made them 
acceptable to the state and located them as hybrids between the third sector and the state.  
 
The experience of heNPOs, on the other hand, suggests that hybridisation in the Russian 
context is not only a response to resource dependency which is indirect or informal in 
nature but also takes on more formalised ways of organising. The sucking in narrative of 
heNPO respondents and their lack of engagement with the emerging vertical ties for dissent 
represented a formal route to hybridisation for this part of the Russian third sector. 
Significantly, respondents did not regard this process as co-option but as collaboration  a 
way of aligning the objectives of their organisations with those of the state. They 
understood themselves as occupying a dual role  spanning and indeed managing the 
boundary between the aspirations of the third sector and the responsibilities of the state 
rather than achieving full insider status by shaping state policy. While organisations were 
enabled to engage with the state and thus create potential opportunities for influence this 
approach reduced the potential for NPOs to criticise the activities of the state or oppose 
formal power arrangements (Ray, 1999). It was difficult for a Russian heNPO to protest 
openly about a state policy it had been a part of delivering. The possibility of raising 
questions or issues about the actions of the state was also constrained by the way in which 
hybridisation took place. It tended to be driven by individuals rather than by organisations 
and their causes.  The process of sucking in increased the opportunities for individuals to 
undertake informal advocacy for causes at the same time it reduced the opportunities for 
organisations to protest formally. The quiet (or silent) and private approach to protest 
conducted by the sucking in narrative has also been observed elsewhere as part of the 
professionalization and institutionalisation of social action that has been termed NGOization 
(Alvarez et al., 1998; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 1997).  
 
Our findings reveal that the drive towards the institutionalisation of access to state 
authorities and power holders has been largely the result of the development of incentives 
for key individuals from within Russian NPOs to deploy their activities within state agencies 
and for the NGOs to tailor their activities to those which are seen to be acceptable to the 
state and those that supplement state activity.  These key individuals play the role described 
by Lewis as boundary crossers who, while engaged in one sector (State or NPO) at a time, 
move backwards and forwards across [sector] boundaries (Lewis, 2008: p.572)  Their 
frequent movements between sectors enables them to oil the relationship between 
government and third sector [NPOs] (ibid). In the Russian context, individuals are 
responsible for managing the boundary between the third sector or what their organisation 
does and the activities of the state in their organisations area of activity. Many of them still 
consider themselves (and the NPOs with which they work) as agents of the third sector but 
they have increasingly also become seen as agents of the state. Those who manage the 
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boundaries of the two sectors may now find opportunities for NPOs to be heard by the 
government; to access resources from the state, and to achieve the kind of legitimacy that 
they were missing during the political and economic turmoil of the 1990.  
 
We argue that the effects of hybridisation by integration with the state changes the third 
sector logic of activism or holding the state to account into one as serving the greater social 
good as determined by the state. In the short-term, the managed democracy of the Russian 
Federation means that, although NPOs may become varying forms of hybrid, they tend to 
be aligned closely with the states logic of control and minimising dissent. But in the longer 
term, their role of managing the boundary between third sector and the state may lead 
them to become institutional entrepreneurs who can stimulate change from within. Thus 
boundary managers may in future be able to carve out broader campaigning opportunities 
for their organisations (Newman, 2012). This is, of course, speculative; what we can say with 
any certainty at the moment is that the boundaries between the state and the third sector 
in Russia have become increasingly blurred and the future lines between them will continue 
to shift over time as the processes of hybridisation continues to develop. 
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